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FEDERAL LAW AND SYRINGE
PRESCRIPTION AND DISPENSING
Daniel Abrahamsont
INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER ADDRESSES the following two questions:
(1) To what extent do federal controlled substances, food and
drug, or paraphernalia laws regulate the individual physi-
cian's or pharmacist's discretion to provide sterile injection
equipment for injection drug users (LDUs)?; and
(2) How could federal officials use their legal and political
authority to discourage physicians or pharmacists from
acting?
It concludes that, at present, federal law does not regulate
physician prescription or pharmacist dispensing of syringes
(pursuant to a valid prescription) to IDUs. Before federal offi-
cials could lawfully intervene in this area of medicine, new
legislation expressly conferring power on federal authorities to
regulate the physician prescription (and pharmacist dispensing)
of syringes would need to be enacted. Nonetheless, as physi-
cians in California and Oregon learned in recent years, federal
officials might try to intimidate physicians if syringe prescrip-
tion and dispensing were considered to be at odds with national
drug war orthodoxy. The California and Oregon examples,
however, also illustrate that when federal officials overstep their
t The author is Director of Legal Affairs of the Lindesmith Center-Drug Pol-
icy Foundation, Adjunct Professor of Law at Boalt Hall (University of California-
Berkley) and Hastings College of Law, and counsel-of-record in Conant v. McCaf-
frey, discussed below. B.A., Yale University, 1986; M.A., Oxford University, 1988;
J.D., New York University, 1991.
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authority to control the practice of medicine at the state level,
this overreaching can be rebuffed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Limits of Federal Law in Proscribing
Syringe Prescription
Three bodies of federal statutory law conceivably cover sy-
ringe prescribing and dispensing: the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and the
Federal Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act ("Parapher-
nalia Act"). As explained below, none of these reach the physi-
cians who prescribe or pharmacists who dispense syringes. Ac-
cordingly, federal law need not pose an obstacle to physician
prescribing and pharmacy dispensing of syringes to IDUs.
a. The FDCA
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act' empowers the
Department of Health and Human Services to approve drugs,
devices, and cosmetics as safe and effective for medical use,
public consumption, and marketing in interstate commerce. Sy-
ringes, like most medical devices, are deemed Class II devices
by the FDCA-devices that pose some, but not a great risk of
harm and which are subject to modest controls "necessary to
provide adequate assurance of safety and effectiveness.,'
2
The FDCA's classification scheme, however, aims to
regulate the design, manufacturing, labeling, and marketing in
interstate commerce of medical devices and products--it does
not attempt to regulate medical practice, which is left to the
states. Thus, while the FDCA authorizes federal officials to
regulate syringe manufacturers to insure that they produce a
sound medical device, and that syringe distributors insure
proper labeling of their medical products, the FDCA does not
authorize federal officials to dictate how syringes that are law-
fully produced, packaged, marketed, and distributed are to be
used by health professionals in the course of their professional
practice.
'21 U.S.C.A. § 301-397 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
21 U.S.C.A. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (West 1999).
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b. The CSA
The Controlled Substances Act is an anti-drug abuse law
enforcement statute administered by the Attorney General and
enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
which is part of the Department of Justice.3 As its name sug-
gests, the CSA controls the authorized distribution of scheduled
drugs, not the distribution of devices. Accordingly, by its terms,
the CSA does not purport to regulate access to syringes.
Even if one were to ignore the plain language of the CSA
and construe the definition of controlled substances to encom-
pass syringes (and there are several reasons why a court would
not permit this to occur), the CSA, like the FDCA, does not
regulate the practice of medicine, which is left to the states.
4
Thus, even this implausible reading of the CSA would not
authorize DEA officials to second-guess the propriety of a phy-
sician's prescription of a syringe to an IDU, or the pharmacist's
filling of that prescription. Put differently, while the DEA can
sanction physicians who act contrary to the "public interest,"
outside "the usual course of medical practice," or in the absence
of a "legitimate medical purpose," 5 historically these standards
have been established at the state level as opposed the federal
level. Thus, the propriety of a physician's prescription practice
is an inquiry left traditionally, and almost without exception, to
the states and their medical licensing boards. It is not clear that
the DEA has ever sanctioned a physician for prescribing a con-
trolled substance or medical device absent a prior finding at the
state level that the physician acted improperly or in bad faith.
c. The Paraphernalia Act
The Federal Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act
("Paraphernalia Act") governs interstate or foreign commerce in
equipment intended for drug consumption. 6 The Paraphernalia
"21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
4 The sole exception to this general rule is the CSA's prohibition of the pre-
scription of opioids to maintain an opiate addiction. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (1994)
(requiring practitioners to annually obtain registration if they are dispensing narcotic
drugs for maintenance or detoxification treatments).
" See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (1994) (stating that the Attorney General may
deny practitioner registration applications if issuance would be inconsistent with the
public interest).
21 U.S.C. § 863 (1994). Technically speaking, the Paraphernalia Act is part
of the Controlled Substances Act, having been repealed as a free-standing law and
20011
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Act ostensibly defines syringes as drug paraphernalia and pur-
ports to regulate their distribution.7 However, there is a persua-
sive argument that the Act, by its terms, does not apply to phy-
sician-prescribed or pharmacy-dispensed syringes. The Act sets
forth various criteria for determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, and contrasts paraphernalia with objects used by
"legitimate suppliers" that have "legitimate uses . . . in the
community."
8
The Act further contemplates reliance on expert testimony
about whether the object is drug paraphernalia or something
else, such as a medical device.9 When applied to the prescribing
or dispensing of sterile syringes to IDUs by health profession-
als, there is a strong argument that these syringes fall outside
the Act's definition of paraphernalia and squarely within the
category of medical devices, much like the syringes prescribed
and/or dispensed to diabetics.
Even if one were to reject this definitional argument, the
Paraphernalia Act only regulates equipment that is sold or of-
fered for sale, or transported by the mails, or any other facility
of interstate commerce. 10 Thus, to the extent that a physician
issues a prescription for a syringe without use of the mails or
other facilities of interstate commerce (e.g., the phone lines),
the Act would not reach the physician's conduct. A valid pre-
scription for syringes, in turn, would serve to transform the sy-
ringes from drug paraphernalia into a medical device that the
pharmacist would be permitted to dispense or sell.
Finally, and perhaps most decisively, subsection (f) of sec-
tion 863, entitled "Exemptions," states that "[t]his section shall
not apply to ... any person authorized by local, State, or Fed-
eral law to manufacture, possess, or distribute such items.""
The exemption reflects Congress' focus on the commercial
head-shop industry, and its intention not to sweep within the
paraphernalia law persons who have traditionally used covered
items for legitimate purposes. Physicians and pharmacists are
explicitly authorized to possess, use, and distribute syringes in
inserted virtually unaltered into the CSA in 1990. For purposes of this paper, how-
ever, the CSA and Paraphernalia Act are discussed as distinct statutory schemes.
See 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (1994).
821 U.S.C. § 863(e)(5), (7) (1994).
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 863(e)(8) (1994).
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) (1994).
" 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (1994).
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about half the states, and in the remainder have the implicit
authorization of their professional status and long-standing
practice. The exemption, moreover, applies to the person, not
the specific transaction, so that even if it were claimed that the
specific provision of the syringe was prohibited by state law,
the fact that the provider is generally authorized to possess or
distribute the item would be sufficient to trigger the immunity.
In sum, federal law should not pose a bar to syringe pre-
scription.
2. The Limits of Federal Muscle Flexing in Proscribing
Syringe Prescription
In light of the politicization of our national drug control
policy, it is conceivable that, notwithstanding the above legal
analysis, federal authorities might try to discourage physicians
from prescribing or pharmacists from dispensing sterile injec-
tion equipment to IDUs. Indeed, as this paper goes to press,
such a scenario gains plausibility with President-elect George
W. Bush's nomination of Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri to
be the next Attorney General. Senator Ashcroft has publicly
claimed that "[a] government which takes the resources that we
would devote toward the interdiction of drugs and converts
them to treatment resources . . . and also implements a clean
needle program is a government that accommodates us at our
lowest and least instead of calls us to our highest and best."'12 It
is not difficult to imagine parents or religious groups, for exam-
ple, attempting to mobilize the Justice Department to quash sy-
ringe prescription and dispensing to IDUs, claiming that these
practices somehow weaken the "Just Say No to Drugs" philoso-
phy which has dominated the federal response to the problem of
substance abuse for over twenty years.
Recent precedent is instructive both as to the willingness of
federal authorities to exceed their legal authority, as well as the
ability of citizens to have federal law enforced. Specifically, in
December 1996, the DEA and other federal officials threatened
to sanction California physicians who recommended the medi-
cal use of marijuana to their patients and other physicians pur-
12 Ashcroft Hailed Confederates as 'Patriots' (posted Dec. 28, 2000)
<http://www.msnbe.comlnews/508290.asp#BODY>.
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suant to that State's Compassionate Use Act.'3 In 1997, the
DEA threatened to sanction Oregon physicians who prescribed
narcotics to hasten their patients' deaths pursuant to Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act.' Physicians aware of these precedents
may be concerned that prescribing syringes could make them a
target of similar pressure. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of these
events suggests that the ability of the government to actually
sanction physicians is remote.
In California, shortly after being threatened with sanctions
for recommending medical marijuana to patients, physicians
filed a class action suit in federal court against the Administra-
tor of the DEA, the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (the "drug czar"), the Attorney General of the
United States, and the Secretary for Health and Human Serv-
ices. The physicians claimed that the federal threats abridged
their First Amendment rights of free speech and unlawfully ex-
ceeded the federal government's authority by attempting to
regulate medical practice absent express authority to do so by
the CSA. Shortly after the suit was filed, a federal trial court
issued a preliminary injunction preventing the government from
acting upon its threats. 15 In September 2000, the court issued a
permanent injunction, finding that the government exceeded its
statutory authority under the CSA to threaten doctors with
sanctions for having certain discussions with, or making par-
ticular medical recommendations to their patients.16 As part of
its analysis, the court emphasized that Congress was silent as to
whether it intended the CSA to reach the specific conduct (phy-
sicians recommending medical marijuana) that gave rise to the
federal threats. 17 As discussed above, the CSA is similarly silent
about physicians prescribing or pharmacists dispensing sterile
syringes to IDUs.
In Oregon, when the DEA threatened physicians who pre-
scribed narcotics in compliance with that State's Death with
Dignity Act, it was pointed out to lawyers for the Department of
Justice that, as with the DEA's threats against California doc-
13 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2000) (giving Cali-
fornians the right to obtain and use medically prescribed marijuana without fear of
criminalProsecution).
'OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (1999).
15See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
16 See Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at **33-34
17 See id.
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tors, the DEA's threats against Oregon physicians were made
without statutory basis. Attorney General Janet Reno, upon re-
viewing the Controlled Substances Act and other federal laws
agreed. In publicly retracting the DEA's threats, Attorney Gen-
eral Reno explained:
18
There is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, in-
tended to displace the states as the primary regulators of
the medical profession, or to override a state's determi-
nation as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice
in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that practice.
Indeed, the CSA is essentially silent with regard to
regulating the practice of medicine that involves legally
available drugs .... 19
The Attorney General's analysis is equally applicable to the
practice of medicine that involves the prescription of legally
available medical devices such as syringes. As a result, even if
politics prompted federal officials to voice opposition to physi-
cian prescription and pharmacy dispensing of syringes to IDUs,
federal law, as it currently stands, does not authorize the offi-
cials to sanction these health care professionals.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it appears that federal law does
not regulate physician prescription or pharmacist dispensing of
syringes to IDUs. Such regulation would take place at the state
level, if at all.
18 Statement of Attorney General Reno on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,
Dep't of Justice Press Release (June 5, 1998). at 3. Available at
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/opalpr/19981June1259ag.htm.html> (visited Sept. 22,2000).
19 In recognition of the CSA's general silence when it comes to regulating
medical practice, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2260, the "Pain
Relief Promotion Act of 1999," which, if signed into law, would give the DEA
authority to regulate medical practice in the field of pain management by permitting
DEA agents to assess physician intent in prescribing narcotic analgesia to pain pa-
tients to determine whether the narcotics were prescribed in order to relieve pain or
hasten death. See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (2000).
2001]

